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1WAS THERE A STATISTICAL TURN ? THE INTERACTIONS
BETWEEN MECHANICS AND PROBABILITY IN BOLTZMANN’S
THEORY OF NON EQUILIBRIUM (1872-1877)
1. OVERVIEW
Like many fundamental episodes of the history of science, also
Boltzmann’s route to the statistical version of thermodynamics has progressively
crystalized in a standard historiographical reconstruction, a so-called “received
view”. According to it, the initial purely mechanical standpoint adopted by
Boltzmann was proved unteneable by means of cogent objections which obliged
him to change his mind and to framed the Second Principle of thermodynamcs in
a statistical way. For seek of simplicity henceforth I refer to this view as the
Klein thesis”, because it was clearly developed for the first time in Martin J.
Klein’s important paper “The Development of Boltzmann’s Statistical Ideas”.
Furthermore, for seek of completeness, I divide the Klein thesis in five sub-theses:
(K1) Boltzmann’s view of the role and the meaning of probability deeply
changed from 1868 to 1877.1
(K2) This change is due more to external criticisms than to a natural
internal evolution.2
(K3) The theory framed in 1872 is a purely mechanical one. Probabilistic
elements emerge only later and as a means to reconcile the reversibility of
mechanical laws with the irreversibility of thermodynamic phenomena.3
(K4) In 1872 Boltzmann maintains a deterministic version of H-theorem,
namely a version according to which the H-function monotonically decreases as a
consequence of molecular collisions until it reaches a minimum value.
Loschmidt’s criticisms induced Boltzmann to change his opinion and to claim a
statistical version of the same theory: the temporal decrease of the H-function is
only a very probable event.4
(K5) The combinatorial theory of 1877 merely is an answer to Loschmdt’s
objections.5
This reconstruction has more or less generally been accepted by the
scholars. Of course, there are nuances of interpretations, but some aspects,
particularly theses (K3) e (K4), gained a wide agreement in literature.6
                                                 
1 Klein 1973, 55.
2 Klein 1973, 55.
3 Klein 1973, 56.
4 Klein 1973, 73.
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2Occasionally some criticisms were arisen. For instance, Jan von Plato sometimes
argued against (K3) claiming that the theory of 1872 cannot be considered purely
(or completely) mechanical, and pointing out that the elements of continuity in the
development of Boltzmann’s thought are as important as the elements of
discontinuity.7 Nonetheless, in the literature no systematic discussions of the
Klein thesis and no detailed historiographic analysis of all its parts can be found.
The question whether the general route it pictures actually fits with the historical
facts or rather it has “mithologized” this route itself is not yet settled down. This
paper is meant to be a contribution towards this direction.
The real conceptual core of the Klein thesis can be reduced to the two
following statements:
(1) Mechanical approach and probabilistic approach are incompatible.
(2) Boltzmann’s theory trasforms itself from a mechanical to a
probabilistic one.
The statement (1) – which is a very general presupposition – is the
foundation of the statement (2), because if mechanical approach and probabilistic
approach are incompatible, then they cannot be adopted at the same time, but one
must follow the other. In other words, the thesis of a deep caesura in Boltzmann’s
views on thermodynamics relies on the thesis that the probabilistic tools are
completely foreign, and unsuitable, to the mechanical point of view. Indeed, if a
standpoint according to which the behavior of the physical world is ruled by
deterministic mechanical laws is adopted, then the use of probabilistic concepts
and tecniques can be justified only appealing to demands of approximation or to
the ignorance of a detailed description of the physical systems. As Boltzmann in
1877 and in his late works often and manifestly ascribes a clear objective meaning
to the statistical fluctuations, it follows that, at that time, he has given up the
dream of a genuine mechanical foundation of thermodynamics.
Of course, this line of reasoning is unexceptionable, but the question is:
did Boltzmann really agree with the statements (1) and (2)? In particular, does the
statement (1) actually represent Boltzmann’s general position about the
relationship between mechanics and probability? An answer to these questions
necessarly involves an investigation about Boltzmann’s understanding of the role
of mechanics in founding thermodynamics, a topic that has often been solved in a
form of, almost naive, reductionism. And it also involves a deep analysis of the
conceptual relationships linking the theory of the equilibrium state developed by
Boltzmann in the period 1868-1871 and the theory of the non equilibrium state
developed in 1872-1877. As it will be clearer in the following sections, this
analysis reveals a state of affairs essentially different from that pictured in the
Klein thesis. It shows to us that the development of Boltzmann’s thought is
chacterized by continuity, that the equilibrium theory relies on foundations which
are, at the same time, mechanical and probabilistic and that the non equilibrium
theory stems directly as a development of these foundations. From this point of
view the combinatorial theory of 1877 represents the emergence of conceptual
elements previously in the background rather than a real methodological and
philosophical turn.
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3In order to support these claims I will divide my analysis in three different
steps. The first step consists in arguing for the following thesis:
(1*) According to Boltzmann there does not exist any incompatibility
between mechanical and probabilistic approach. Using the deterministic laws of
mechanics does not compel us to interpret the probabilistic arguments merely as a
mean to support our lack of information. In other words, Boltzmann regards
probabilistic tecniques as compatible with mechanics. In particular, there is no
contraddiction between probabilistic tools and the formal tools of the analytic
mechanics developed by Lagrange, Hamilton and Jacobi when they are applied to
a certain type of physical systems.
The second step concerns the following thesis:
(2*) Boltzmann’s theory is characterized by a – not always consistent –
mixture of mechanical and probabilistic elements.
Again, the thesis (1*) is a presupposition for the thesis (2*) because the
mixture of mechanical and probabilistic elements follows from the possibility to
provide a genuine probabilistic description of mechanical systems.
The third step involves a very detailed investigation of the genesis of the
combinatorial theory of 1877 in order to prove that it is not the result of a
statistical turn, but rather the explication of ideas already – even if implicitly –
present in the theory of 1872 and which can be found in the equilibrium theory of
1868 as well. An important role for this goal is played by the analysis of analogies
and differences between the combinatorial arguments in 1868 and in 1877.
2. THE GENERAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF EQUILIBRIUM.
The key to understand the relationship between mechanics and probability
in Boltzmann’s thought is the concept of “diffuse motion”. This concept makes its
first official appearance in the 1868 article entitled “Studien über das
Gleichgewicht der lebendigen Kraft zwischen bewegten materiellen Punkten”
dedicated to a broad discussion of the Maxwell distribution of equilibrium state.
In this paper Boltzmann generalizes the equilibrium distribution taking into
account the two- and three-dimensional cases, the effect of external forces and the
constraint of the conservation of the total energy. The finishing touch of this
remarkable analytical effort is the allgemeine Lösung (General Solution) to the
problem of equilibrium, a section of Boltzmann’s article which has not received in
the literature the attention it deserves.
Boltzmann considers the gas as a system of n material points of mass mi (i
= 1, …, n) whose physical coordinates find themselves within the volumes dsi =
dxidyidzi of the position space and dσi = duidvidwi of the velocity space. If the total
energy is fixed, one coordinate of the velocity – let us suppose the last – is
automatically determined, then the distribution function becomes f(dsi, dσi-1, dωn)





Boltzmann proves with purely analitical methods that, if an infinitesimal
variation transforms the state dsidσidωn into the state ds′idσ′idω′n then:
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Equation (1) is a particular case of the Liouville theorem and concerns the
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i.e. the distribution function is a constant as well. The results (1) and (2) are not
usual in the kinetic theories of gases in 1860s. Although kinetic theory essentially
was a mechanical theory, the formal tools used were mainly those of elementary
mechanics. Boltzmann was among the first using the formal machinery and the
concepts of analytical mechanics.8 However, in the General Solution Boltzmann
goes beyond the limits of analytical mechanics itself because his fundamental
move is the generalization of (1) and (2) – which are theoretically limited to the
actual phase trajectory of the system – to the whole phase space allowed by the
constraint on the total energy.9 This move attracted Maxwell’s criticisms more
than ten years later. Although Maxwell basically agreed with Boltzmann’s formal
argument, he pointed out that the generalization to the whole phase space allowed
by the total energy necessarily requires an ergodic hypothesis.10 For brevity I will
call henceforth the generalization of (1) and (2) to the whole hypersurface of
constant energy the “Boltzmann-Liouville theorem”.
If the Boltzmann-Liouville theorem is the General Solution to the problem
of equilibrium, what is Boltzmann’s view of the equilibrium state? In order to
comprehend this point let us analyze three important consequences of the General
Solution. The first consequence is the following:11
The probability that the point m1 finds itself within the space element ds1, the point m2
within ds2, …, the end-point of the [velocity vector] c1 of the first point within dσ1, the end-point
of the [velocity vector] c2 of the second point within dσ2, …, and finally the end-point of the




ds1ds2...dsndσ1dσ 2...dσ n−1dω n.
In other words, the probability that the representative point of the system
finds itself within a certain phase region depends on the measure of this region.
                                                 
8 Likely, the first systematic expositions of these results can be found in Watson 1876 (see
expecially 21-24).
9 Boltzmann 1868, 95.
10 Maxwell 1879, 714, 722.
11 Boltzmann 1868, 95.
5Accordingly, elementary regions of equal measure are equiprobable.12 The second
consequence is that the Boltzmann-Liouville theorem justifies the combinatory
derivation of the equilibrium distribution developed in the second part of the 1868
paper.13 The third consequence is that, as Boltzmann always understands the
distribution function and the probability as sojourn time in a certain state,14 the
General Solution implies that the system will pass through all the physical states
compatible with its total energy, i.e. its motion will be “diffuse” in the entire
phase space. The last two consequences, the capability of justifying the
combinatorial derivation and the concept of diffuse motion, are the most
problematic and represent the real core of the General Solution. Thus, I will focus
on these two points and try to answer to the following question: how does,
according to Boltzmann, the concept of diffuse motion justify the combinatorial
analysis and the use of combinatorial arguments? I claim that the answer lies in
two fundamental roles played by this concept.
In the first place, it divides the phase space in “elementary events”, an
indispensable presupposition for the combinatorial analysis. Indeed, Boltzmann
understood the equilibrium as a complex phenomenon which stems from the
combination of a lot of elementary equiprobable events. This view was common
among the advocates of the so-called “social statistics”,15 but it was absolutely not
usual in kinetic theory before Boltzmann. Neither Maxwell, nor Clausius made
clear attempts to characterize combinatorially the equilibrium state. In any case, if
the motion is diffuse, then the position-space configurations in formula (1)
immediately become the sought elementary events which the combinatorial
derivation of the equilibrium distribution can build on.
In the second place, diffuse motion justifies the combinatorial analysis
because under this condition the details of motion, i.e. the precise specification of
the micro-state of the system, are irrelevant. In fact, if a system passes through all
the states of the allowed phase space, there is only a phase trajectory covering the
whole space, so no detailed specification of initial and final states is required in
order to describe the trajectory itself. Indeed, its description coincides with the
combinatorial analysis of the elementary states forming the space.
This aspect of the concept of diffuse motion is close connected with
Boltzmann’s previous application of analytical mechanics to the problems of
thermodynamics. In 1866, looking for a mechanical analogy of the Second
Principle, Boltzmann investigated the possibility to apply the principle of the
Least Action to the study of the motion of a system with many degrees of
freedom. In that paper Boltzmann was also concerned with the problem of
neglecting the details of motion, in particular by means of special periodicity
assumptions that allow to erase the initial and final condition from the action
integral.16 These researches are the real premises of the concept of diffuse motion
and of the Boltzmann-Liouville theorem. In fact, Boltzmann shows that in a
                                                 
12 Of course, this conclusion requires that the probability measure is absolutely continous with the
Lebesgue measure of the phase space. Boltzmann, however, could not take into account this aspect
which will be come clear only in the next century (cf. von Plato 1994, 27-70).
13 Boltzmann 1868, 95.
14 Boltzmann 1868, 50, 85; cf. anche Boltzmann 1881, 582.
15 Cf. Porter 1986.
16 Boltzmann 1866, 24, 28-29, Biehrhalter 1981, von Plato 1994, 76-77. On the historical
development of this research programme see Bierhalter 1992.
6infinitely slow mechanical transformation (equivalent to a thermodynamic
adiabatic transformation) the action is an invariant. The connection between this
result and the Boltzmann-Lioville theorem will become apparent in 1916 when
Paul Ehrenfest will show that the geometrical meaning of this result is just the
invariance of the elementary phase volume.17 Thus, there is a clear connection in
Boltzmann’s thought between the mechanical analysis of systems of material
points with many degrees of freedom and the presuppostions of the combinatorial
calculus.
I add two further considerations. First, Jan von Plato suggested that the
view of probability as a temporal average was developed by Boltzmann in close
analogy with the kinetic interpretation of temperature as a temporal average of the
energy.18 Scarce attention was paid to the possible mechanical origin of this
concept and in particular to the relationship between the diffuse motion and the
temporal average meaning of probability. Actually, if the motion of the system is
diffuse, the time of sojourn in a certain phase region is a natural tools to describe
the motion itself, so it seems very plausible that Boltzmann framed this meaning
of probability from his studies in analytical mechanics applied to complex
systems.
Second, it is apparent that the concept of diffuse motion bears on the
modern notion of ergodicity. Nonetheless, although Boltzmann has the general
concept of ergodicity and he is aware of its functions and meaning, he never
frames, at this stage, an explicit ergodic hypothesis. I think that this aspect cannot
be neglected. Whereas Maxwell openly states a formal ergodic hypothesis as a
fundamental requirement of the equilibrium theory, in Boltzmann this concept
always remains in the background as a general assumption on the dynamic
systems. For this reason I prefer to separate the “hard” notion of ergodicity from
the “soft” notion of diffuse motion. Indeed, Boltzmann understands the diffuse
motion as a sort of presupposition which is weaker than a formal physical
hypothesis, which is somehow intuitively clear and which does not require any
strictly formal expression.19 Instead of formulating the diffuse motion formally,
Boltzmann provides mechanical models able to represent it, as we will see in the
next section.
To be sure, the system of concepts used by Boltzmann to bridge the gap
between mechanical approach and probabilistic tools (diffuse motion,
equiprobability, independence of phase coordinates) has a very peculiar
epistemological status: these ideas form a sort of conceptual network without a
rigid hierarchy. In different physical contexts each of them can assume a
foundational role from which the others can be derived. In other words, it seems
that Boltzmann’s approach to the relationships between mechanics and probability
is not axiomatic, rather analogic: conceptual links and formal similarity are more
important than a strict division between axioms and consequences.
                                                 
17 Ehrenfest 1916, 333-334.
18 Von Plato 1991; 1994.
19 On Boltzmann’s and Maxwell’s ergodic hypothesis see von Plato 1991.
73. MECHANICAL MODELS OF PROBABILISTIC PROCESSES.
The diffuse motion is a fundamental requirement to apply probabilistic and
combinatorial tecniques to the study of mechanical systems. Instead of giving a
formal definition of this concept, in 1871 Boltzmann proposes a model of a
mechanical system whose motion fills the whole phase space: a mechanical model
of the diffuse motion. Boltzmann restricts his argument to the bidimensional case
and starts with the following remark: if the equations of motion are able to limit
the trajectory of the system to a subset of the phase space and one coordinate is
known, then, in general, the other coordinate is automatically determined. A clear
example is the motion of a material point around a center of force attracting it
with a Newtonian potential. In his 1870 article on the virial theorem, Rudolf
Clausius called this kind of motion “stationary”.20 The stationary motions include,
like Clausius himself said, periodical motions like the planets’ ones.
However, Boltzmann adds, we can imagine motions which do not meet
this condition. For this kind of motions, knowing a coordinate allows us only to
fix a certain set of possible values for the other.21 In order to make the problem
clearer, Boltzmann supposes that the force attracting the material point is (a/r) +
(b/r2). In this case the trajectory is a sequence of ellipses whose form depends on
the constants a and b. If the angle formed by the absidal lines of two ellipses is a
rational multiple of π, the motion will be strictly periodic, but if this is not the
case, the motion will pass, in the long run, through all the points of the circular
region included in the circumferences whose radii are the major and the minor
axes of the ellipses. In other words, such a motion will be diffuse into the allowed
space. This sort of stationary-diffuse motion has two important consequences.
First, for such a motion a concept of probability as sojourn time in an
arbitrary phase region can be defined.22 This consideration substantiates the thesis
according to which the concept of probability as sojourn time stems from a
mechanical context.
Second, for a diffuse motion the phase coordinates «are mutually
independent (only they limit each other within given limits)».23 The independence
of phase coordinates belongs to the conceptual network used by Boltzmann in
facing the problem of the relationship between mechanics and probability. It is an
essential condition because if the phase coordinates are mutually independent, the
behavior of a mechanical system is completely analogous to the behavior of a
stochastic model such as drawing from a lottery or throwing dice.
Boltzmann deals with this problem also in his article of 1877 entitled
“Bemerkungen über einige Probleme der mechanischen Wärmetheorie” where the
first answer to Loschmidt’s objection can be found. In the third part of this
article24 he develops a detailed analysis of the possible motions of a material point
which ends with the following remarks. If a material point of mass m moves
around a center of force O attracting it with force f(r), where r is the distance from
O, the trajectory of the point can (a) diverge towards infinite or (b) remain limited
                                                 
20 Clausius 1870, 123.
21 Boltzmann 1871b, 269.
22 Boltzmann 1871b, 270.
23 Boltzmann 1871b, 270.
24 Boltzmann 1877a, 122-148.
8within a finite region of the space. Motion of type (a) can be divided into two sub-
classes: (a1) trajectories which come near O only one time and then diverge and
(a2) trajectories which orbit many times around O before diverging.
The trajectories (b) can be divided into two sub-classes as well: (b1) spiral-
like trajectories which come nearer and nearer O, or (b2) trajectories characterized
by many approaches to, and removal from, the center of force. Trajectories of type
(b2) can assume many different forms but have a sort of periodicity because they
remain in a intermediate state between diverging and falling on the center of
force.25 However, Boltzmann notes, this does not mean that a trajectory of the
type (b2) is necessarly closed, i.e. it passes only through a sub-region of the
allowed space:
Even if it is completely contained in a finite region, the trajectory is not in general a
closed one. Only if the angle between two successive absidal lines has a rational ratio with π, the
trajectory is closed. If this angle is π, then r […] has only one maximum and one minimum like the
motion of the planets. If it is π/2, r has two equal maxima and two equal minima, like in the
infinitesimal oscillation of a conic pendulum. If this angle is π/4, the trajectory has the form of a
four-points star, if it is π/6 a six-points star.26
Accordingly, if the ratio of the angle of two absidal lines and π  is
irrational, the trajectory will pass through all the points of the allowed space. This
is exactly the result Boltzmann had already obtained in 1871 and it represents the
mechanical analogy of a diffuse motion.
To sum up, according to Boltzmann a real contraddiction between
mechanical approach and probability does not exist, provided that some general
conditions are respected. Generally (and a bit roughly) speaking, his argument can
be summarized as follows. The classical approach to the study of a mechanical
system requires the knowledge of the equation of motion (or a complete set of
integrals of motion) and the specification of the initial state (or the initial and final
state of the trajectory). However, in case of a system with many degrees of
freedom this method is unsuitable because the system is far too complex. But, to
be sure, this method is really indespensable only if the system passes through a
sub-region of the allowed phase space because, if this is the case, we need to
distinguish between the states effectively belonging to the history of the system
from the states which are merely physically possible. Now, if the system passes
through all the physically possible states, the classical method provides us with a
lot of irrelevant information and it can be replaced by a combinatorial analysis of
the phase space.
As far as this Boltzmann’s position is concerned, I add two remarks. First,
it belongs to the train of thought which endeavours to find a reconciliation
between deterministic mechanical laws and an objective view of probability.
Indeed, Boltzmann’s cases are quite analogous to Nicola Oresme’s studies on the
“ergodicity of rotation”.27 Jan von Plato pointed out that these attempts use a
conceptual system, consisting of notions like “independence”, “instability of the
trajectories”, “annihilation of dynamical correlations” and so on, which is similar
                                                 
25 Boltzmann 1877a, 146-147.
26 Boltzmann 1877a, 147.
27 Von Plato, 1994, 279-287.
9to Boltzmann’s.28 It is worth noting that, although Boltzmann occasionally uses
the concept of trajectory instability,29 the main role in his approach to the problem
is played by the concept of diffuse motion. Scarce attention was paid by the
scholars to the function of this concept in Boltzmann’s approach and, more
generally, in the train of thought above mentioned.
Second, according to Boltzmann, using probability arguments in the study
of mechanical systems is not due to our ignorance of the specific conditions, but
to the fact that the information provided us from the details of motion is
irrelevant. Thus, contrary to Maxwell, the probabilistic analysis completely
replaces the classical approach as a logically equivalent, and formally more
efficient, alternative. The autonomous status of the probabilistic arguments will be
defended by Boltzmann also in the introduction of his article of 1872.30
4. MECHANICS AND PROBABILITY IN NON EQUILIBRIUM THEORY.
The main consequence of the compatibility between mechanical approach
and probabilistic arguments is that a mechanical system with many particles can
be compared to «as many individuals in the most different conditions of motion»31
or to a stochastic model pictured in close analogy with the games of chance.32
This analogy plays an essential role in the theory of 1877, however, the mixture of
probabilistic and mechanical elements can be found also in the “mechanical”
version of the non equilibrium theory developed by Boltzmann in 1872. In this
section I will particularly focus on the analysis of the collision mechanism whose
probabilistic character has not yet been discussed in the literature.
The theory of 1872 relies on two assumptions: (1) the equiprobability of
the directions of motion and (2) the equiprobability of the positions in space.33
Boltzmann hypothesizes that each molecule, whatever the kinetic energy, can
assume every direction and every position with the same probability. The
argument with which Boltzmann justifies such assumptions is peculiar: he says
that in a system without external influences a progressive mixture will take place
which will cancel any “non uniform” initial condition, e.g. conditions in which
fast and slow molecules occupy different regions of space. It is a natural tendency
of the system to leave a non uniform initial condition to reach a sort of uniform
distribution as far as positions and directions of motion are concerned. Boltzmann
adds that, as this process will take place in the long run, we can assume the
equiprobability of positions and directions of motion from the start.34
These two uniformity assumptions remarkably weaken the argomentative
structure of the theory, because they deal with a process of mixing (of positions
and directions) completely analogous to that which Boltzmann is willing to derive
                                                 
28 Von Plato 1983; 1987; 1994.
29 Cf. e.g. Boltzmann 1868, 96.
30 Boltzmann 1872, 316-317.
31 Boltzmann 1872, 317.
32 For example, Boltzmann explitcitly refers to a comparison between the evolution of the gas and
the game of dice in Boltzmann 1895, 540.
33 Boltzmann 1872, 321-322.
34 Boltzmann 1872, 322; already in 1871 Boltzmann introduced the mixing process in an intuitive
way, without a clear formal justification, cf. Boltzmann 1871a, 240.
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for kinetic energy. Accordingly, Boltzmann can prove the uniforming of energy,
summarized in the equilibrium distribution, only assuming that a similar
uniforming process takes place for positions and directions of motion. Why
Boltzmann, who was well aware of the role played by the uniformity
hypotheses,35 tolerated such a weakening of his conclusions? There are two main
reasons.
First, as positions and directions of motions are the collision parameters
characterizing the mechanical process of molecular collision, the equiprobability
of these parameters justifies, from Boltzmann’s standpoint, the possibility of
representing the collision process as a stochastic model because, as we have seen,
under these conditions the mechanical analysis can be replaced by a probabilistic
analysis. In a molecular collision a pair of molecules enters in the process with
some kinetic energies (enter energies) and exits from the process with some other
energies (exit energies). In the long run this process succeeds in mixing the energy
distribution towards the uniformity. But Boltzmann makes clear that the mixing
effect ascribed to the collisions is derived from the variety of the impact
conditions which make every pair of exit energies equiprobable independently of
the pair of enter energies.36 No attempts are made to characterized this
transformation from a purely mechanical point of view. Instead, the real core of
the uniforming effect of the collision process is understood as a sort of game of
chance regarding the two pairs of energies, whose details I will show later on.
Second, the two uniformity assumptions imply that the function f
expressing the energy distribution is representative of the state of the system.
Indeed, if the state of the system is non uniform, the value of the distribution
function depends on the region where it is computed. On the contrary, if the state
is uniform, the distribution is constant in every region of the space (provided that
it is large enough to contain many molecules) and then it describes the system as a
whole.
In order to substantiate this interpretation, I will shortly analize the
stochastic model implicit in Boltzmann’s collision mechanism. To compute the
temporal variation of the distribution function, Boltzmann fixes an arbitrary
energy and reckons the difference between the numbers of molecules acquiring
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35 Cf. Boltzmann 1872, 322: «[the equiprobability of the positions] and the equiprobability of the
directions of motions at the beginning of time are the two limiting assumptions under which the
problem will be dealt with » (italics added).
36 Boltzmann will try to ascribe the uniforming effect to the inner motion of the atoms when he
will generalize his theory to the polyatomic molecule. To accomplish this task, he will assume,
like in 1871, that the phases of the molecules are mutually incommensurable (cf. Boltzmann 1872,
396).
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where x, x′ are the enter energies and ξ, ξ′ the exit energies in the collision
process.
Let fix our attention on the equation (3). The function ψ expresses the
mechanical characteristics of the collision, and Boltzmann will prove that it fulfils
the Liouville theorem.37 Furthermore, the rest of the equation shows an apparent
similarity with an assumption already used by Maxwell in 1867 and closely
connected with the indipendence hypothesis used to describe the behavior of a
game of chance.38 Actually, in the equation (3) the only variables are the energies
x′ and ξ because x is fixed and ξ′ can be derived from the constraint on the total
energy. Now, in calculating the number of collision decreasing the number of
molecules with energy x, Boltzmann’s independence assumption compares the
number of molecules with energy x′ calculated on the actual distribution f and the
number of molecules with energy ξ merely considered as an infinitesimal element
in an integration over all the possibile values. Thus, the collision mechanism
Boltzmann frames it is equivalent to a stochastic model of drawing from two
different urns:
(A1) Drawing of the energy x′ from an urn where the distribution of
energy is defined by the initial function f. This drawing also fixes the limits for the
total energy in the collision process.
(A2) Drawing of the energy ξ from an urn with uniform distribution on all
the possible values in the new total energy interval fixed in (A1).
As in this model the enter energies have a probability depending on the
initial distribution and the exit energies have a probability depending on the
uniform distribution, this model is able, in the long run, to transform the initial
distribution in Maxwell’s distribution, uniform on the elementary configurations
in the phase space. In other words, Boltzmann’s collision mechanism works
because it combines an independent assumption with drawing from urns, so that
the behavior of a mechanical system is considered completely analogous to that of
a game of chance. Similar remarks hold for the equation (4), even though in this
case the model is a little more complex because it must fulfil some other
analytical requirements.
It may be objected that the numbers of collisions (3) and (4) do not
represent a stochastic model, but they are the result of a simple marginalization by
means of which Boltzmann computes the number of collisions decreasing or
increasing the distribution function on a certain energy without taking into
account the exit energies. Although this remark is formally correct, it can be
questioned from a historical point of view. Indeed, some arguments can be
presented in order to claim that Boltzmann’s aim is not merely to calculate a
marginal number of collisions, but to build a particular stochastic model of
collision.
First, Boltzmann does not consider the marginalization procedure a
suitable technique to deal with the problem of non equilibrium. I will clarify this
point in the section 6.
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38 Cf. Maxwell 1867; see also Ehrenfest 1911, 5-6.
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Second, Boltzmann criticizes Maxwell’s theory of collisions because it is
far too limited. In fact, it does not take into account the possibility of a complete
variety of exit energies.39 Such a criticism and Boltzmann’s new – and more
complex – theory of collisions are not understandable if the goal is simply to
marginalize the exit energies. To this aim Maxwell’s view is complete enough.
Third, although the integration over all the possible values may be
formally read as a marginalization, Boltzmann’s procedure has another important
ingredient: it considers the exit energies uniformally distributed. This uniformity
is the real core of Boltzmann’s collision mechanism, and its justification lies in
the General Solution of 1868 where Boltzmann proved that equilibrium requires
uniformity of elementary configurations.
So, it seems that in Boltzmann’s collision mechanism something deeper is
hidden. It cannot be reduced to a standard formal procedure, but it involves a
general view about equilibrium and its conditions, the kind of view that
Boltzmann developed in 1868. Furthermore, it shows how closely mechanical
approach and probabilistic techniques interact: Boltzmann viewed molecular
collisions as a mechanical process which can be described by a stochastic model.
Already in 1872, Boltzmann uses, even if only implicitly, the stochastic model of
the urn which will become the main conceptual tool in the combinatorial theory of
1877.
5. LOSCHMIDT’S OBJECTION.
The non equilibrium theory of 1872 is unsatisfactory and incomplete. It
shows that the system tends to reach a uniform distribution of the energies
provided that it is already uniform as far as positions and directions of motion are
concerned. In other words, it is proved that a certain kind of mixing can happen
only if another kind of mixing holds from the beginning. A general theory of the
mixing process and an explication of this concept are totally absent. Boltzmann
was perfectly aware of these lacks and of the role played by the preliminar
assumptions of uniformity, as the long discussion about them in 1872 confirms.
This awareness had a key role in his interpretation of Loschmidt’s
objection. Indeed, from Boltzmann’s point of view, the core of the problem arisen
by Loschmidt in 1876 did not consist in the possibility of an occasional failure of
the H-theorem or of the uniforming process. These possibilities were openly
admitted by Boltzmann already in 1868 and the proof of the H-theorem in 1872
was obtained by means of an average.40 The real problematic aspects of
Loschmidt’s objection were localized by Boltzmann elsewhere.
To be sure, Loschmidt’s argument stresses that the fundamental
presupposition of Boltzmann’s non equilibrium theory (the mixing of certain
parameters of motion) is not more justified than its contrary from the point of view
of the mechanical laws.41 The italicized statement is the essential point of
                                                 
39 Boltzmann 1872, 319.
40 Cf. Boltzmann 1868, 96 and Boltzmann 1872, 343-345 for the proof of the H-theorem.
41 Loschmidt 1876, 139.
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Loschmidt’s thesis. It suggests that no proof of a preference of the mixing process
can be compatible with the laws of mechanics.
But we have seen that, according to Boltzmann, the compatibility between
probability and mechanics was a point of departure, a presupposition beyond all
dispute. For this reason he simply neglects this aspect of Loschmidt’s argument
and focusses on the first part: to provide a general theory of the mixing process
applicable to every molecular parameter and able to prove that the mixing process
(from non-uniform to uniform distribution) is privileged in comparison to the non-
mixing process (from uniform to non-uniform distribution). Boltzmann’s
interpretation of Loschmidt’s argument is the result of an intense dialogue and of
a personal exchange of ideas, but its general lines are understandable from
Boltzmann’s first answer in 1877. In this article, which I have already mentioned
above, he states that Loschmidt’s argument points against the general possibility
of a transformation from a non-uniform to a uniform distribution: «the sophism
consists in the fact that without taking into account initial conditions, it is not
possible to prove that [the molecules] mix uniformely during the time».42
Boltzmann’s answer to Loschmidt will be developed in detail in the
combinatorial theory, but in this first article some interesting elements can be
already found. In particular, Boltzmann’s first remarks on the problem are divided
into two steps corresponding to two consequences of Loschmidt’s objection.
First, Boltzmann notes that:43
Loschmidt’s law simply allows us to know of initial conditions that, after a certain time t1,
lead to a state distribution which is highly non-uniform.44
This possibility was foreseen already in 1868 and it does not represent a
real difficult for Boltzmann. Loschmidt’s special initial conditions do not fulfil the
requirement of diffusion because the temporal reversal of the molecular
trajectories leads the molecules to certain collisions, while other (physically)
possibile collisions are ruled out in principle. In other words, in Loschmidt’s
objection the initial state shows, to a certain extent, a sort of syncronization and
this state cannot origin a diffuse motion.45 Although it is a genuine mechanical
state, it is an exception, a case explicitly left out from the presuppositions of the
theory. Another important point is that Boltzmann understands Loschmidt’s
objection as a particular case of the problem he already faced in 1866 and 1868,
namely to study the behavior of a system neglecting the details of motion. Such a
behavior has to depend on the general conditions only (e.g. the total energy), but
not on the initial state of the system. This point clearly emerges in a long paper of
1876 entitled “Über die Austellung und Integration der Gleichungen, welche die
                                                 
42 Boltzmann 1877a, 119.
43 Boltzmann 1877a, 120,
44 In this article the terminology is not precise: only in Boltzmann 1877b we have a clear linguistic
distinction between “state distribution” and “complexion”. In Boltzmann 1877a the two terms are
often confused.
45 This argument will clearly emerge in 1890s when Boltzmann will frame the notion of
“molecular chaos” as a condition of the diffuse motion. See, e.g. Boltzmann 1896, 58-59: «the
assumption made there that the state distribution is molecular-disordered is not fulfilled [in
Loschmidt’s temporal reversal], since after exact reversal of all velocities each molecule does not
collide with others according to the laws of probability, but rather it must collide in the previously
calculated manner».
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Molekularbewegung in Gasen bestimmen”,46 where Boltzmann argues that
irrational ratios in the initial energy distribution make «possible the most different
molecular distributions of one [total kinetic energy] (state distribution)».47 The
first step of Boltzmann’s answer is thus to confirm that the theory of non
equilibrium requires certain mechanical conditions. This task will be
accomplished in the third part of the paper where Boltzmann faces again the
problem of the mechanical analogy of the Second Principle of thermodynamics
and pursues the detailed analysis of the trajectories of a system of material points I
have discussed in section 3.
Second, another consequence of Loschmidt’s argument is the following
statement:48
If we know that in a gas, at a certain time, a non uniform distribution is present and that
the gas since a long time was in the container without an external influence, then we have to
conclude that, much time before, the state distribution was uniform and that the unusual case
occurred that it is gradually become non uniform.
Thus, Boltzmann does not question the case presented by Loschmidt, but
rather he proves that it is a consequence of his general view on equilibrium: a non
uniforming evolution is not a possibility totally excluded, but only «unusual». To
substantiate this view an important step is required: proving that high entropy
states are also high-probability states.
To sum up, the outlines of Boltzmann’s answer show all the elements
already developed in the period 1868-1872: the conditions a mechanical system
must fulfil to be probabilistically described, the probabilistic meaning of the
molecular distribution and the equiprobability of the elementary events as a
condition of the combinatorial analysis.49 However, in the period 1868-1872 these
points were strictly interlaced and the close mixture of mechanical and
probabilistic elements made difficult an explication of Boltzmann’s concept of
mixing. In particular, the probabilistic side remained in background in the theory
of equilibrium and in the 1872 version of the theory of non equilibrium.
In 1877 Boltzmann faces the task to divide more clearly the probabilistic
from the mechanical aspect, and proposes a theory where the physical hypotheses
do not play a relevant role and which can be easily extended to any physical
quantity: a really general theory of the mixing process. These goals are apparently
outlined by Boltzmann when he states that his aim concerns «to investigate the
relationships of the laws of probability with the Second Principle of the
mechanical theory of heat»,50 moving in the background specific physical
hypotheses and pointing out the connections between high entropy states and high
probability. Furthermore, he adds (italics added):51
However, I stress that […] I want to derive the probability of a certain state distribution
completely apart from if and how it emerges, or, more exactly expressed, I want to investigate all
the combinations which are possible in the distribution of the p + 1 [kinetic energies] among the n
                                                 
46 See in particular Boltzmann 1876, 71-73.
47 Boltzmann 1876, 72.
48 Boltzmann 1877a, 122.
49 On this point see Boltzmann 1877a, 120.
50 Boltzmann 1877b, 166.
51 Boltzmann 1877b, 168.
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molecules and, as a consequence, to calculate how many combinations correspond  to each state
distribution.
Boltzmann’s aim is to build an analysis which leaves out of consideration
the problems linked to physical details of the system and thus which can be
extended to every systems provided some general conditions, like the diffuse
motion.
In short, Loschmidt’s argument contained nothing of really new from
Boltzmann’s point of view, but rather it made present and incited the requirement
of further explanation of conceptual elements already implicit in 1868 and in
1872. The probabilistic nature of the mixing process was a presupposition which
was not adequately developed in the 1872 theory, because it was overshadowed
by the project of building a physical theory of the thermodynamic systems and of
the transport phenomena in “Maxwell style”. So, the real problem was not the
probabilistic nature of the mixing process in itself, but its explanation in general
terms.
6. COMBINATORIAL THEORIES OF 1868 AND OF 1877.
The combinatorial character of the theory of 1877 is, without doubt, its
main peculiarity. There is no other cases in which Boltzmann makes a use as
explicitly of stochastic models and probabilistic tools as in his article “Über die
Beziehung zwischen dem zweiten Hauptsatze der mechanischen Wärmetheorie
und der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung respective den Sätzen über das
Wärmegleichgewicht”. As we have seen, a stochastic model is implicit also in the
collision mechanism framed by Boltzmann in 1872, but in that theory the purely
kinetic context prevails. In this section I will show that, also in the combinatorial
derivation of Maxwell distribution of 1868, Boltzmann makes use implicitly of a
stochastic model which is completely analogous to the model of 1877. In this way
a deep methodological and conceptual continuity connecting equilibrium and non
equilibrium theory will be pointed out. This aim requires the discussion of
analogies and differences between the combinatorial approaches of 1868 and of
1877.
In both theories two concepts of probability appear: as ratio between
favourable cases and possible cases and as sojourn time in a certain phase region.
In 1877 the latter is introduced by means of a famous stochastic model.52
Boltzmann imagines an urn with many tickets; on each ticket a number of “energy
elements” is reported. Each ticket (and then each “packet” of these elements) is
equiprobable, and so are all the possible sequences drawn from the urn. A lot of
drawings are performed, and, at the end, all the sequences which do not fulfil the
condition of the total energy are neglected. But many sequences still remain, each
of them represents a possible “complexion”, i.e. a micro-configuration of the state
of the system. The relative frequency of a state distribution derives from the
number of complexions corresponding to the distribution itself assuming that the
complexions are equiprobable, namely that each complexion appears «as much
often» as any other in the drawing process. Thus, the relative frequency of a state
                                                 
52 Boltzmann 1877b, 171-172.
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distribution derives from the “equifrequencies” of its complexions.53 Again, the
diffuse motion, translated in a relative-frequencies language, plays the central
role.
But there are differences too. Indeed, the combinatorial derivations of
1868 and 1877 have two different argumentative structures. I will shortly discuss
both the arguments and I will give an interpretation of their dissimilarity.
In 1868 Boltzmann aims to derive the two- and three-dimensional
Maxwell distribution for a system of n particles with total energy nχ where χ is
the average energy. The starting assumption, founded on the Boltzmann-Liouville
theorem, is that all the possible individual dispositions of energy among the
particles (i.e. all the ways to partition the total energy nχ among the n individual
particles) are equiprobable. Accordingly, the problem simply becomes a
combinatorial calculation developed considering the total energy as portioned out
in a very large number p of very small “elements of energy” equal to each other.54
Boltzmann’s argument to obtain the equilibrium distribution relies on the
calculation of the marginal distribution of energy, i.e. on evaluing the probability
that a particle has a certain energy independently from the energy of the other
particles. Boltzmann focusses on the particle with kinetic energy k1. As the total
energy has been portioned out in p elements of dimension nχ/p, p different































As a first step, Boltzmann discusses the cases of two, three and four
particles (n = 2, 3, 4) and computes the total numbers of dispositions which are
compatible with the constraint that a certain particle has energy equal to k1. In a
second step, he generalizes to the case of n particles. Boltzmann’s problem is to
calculate the marginal probability that the energy of the particle is within one of
the intervals defined in (5), i.e. to calculate the probability of the event:
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where q = 1, …, p.
Generalizing the argument already developed in the limited cases
Boltzmann obtains:
                                                 
53 In a note Boltzmann mentions another urn model (Boltzmann 1877b, 172): the drawing process
takes place like in the first model, but, instead of neglecting the sequences which overcome the
energy limit at the end of the process, at each step all the tickets which have become incompatible
with the energy condition are eliminated. However, this model is unsatisfactory from a statistical
point of view, because it is unable to conserve the exchangeability (cf. Costantini, Garibaldi,
Penco 1996, 290-291).
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which is the two-dimensional Maxwell distribution.56
What is the stochastic model implicit in Boltzmann’s argument? Generally
speaking, the combinatorial problem is to compute the number of way in which n
– 1 particles, considered indistiguishable, can be distributed on the p – 1
distinguishable energy intervals defined in (5). A state distribution is a sequence
of occupation numbers, i.e. how many particles are contained in a certain energy
interval. The presupposition of the calculation is that all the configurations, i.e.
the partitioning of individual particles on individual intervals, are equiprobable.
According to these hypotheses the equation (6) becomes:
(9)
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The equation (9) is a particular case of the multivariate Polya
distribution.57 It can be easily shown that the equation (7) is a differential Beta
distribution scaled on nχ and the equation (8) is a differential Gamma distribution,
in accordance with the general theory of statistical distributions.58
Some remarks on Boltzmann’s stochastic model. First of all it is worth
noting that, despite the quantization of the energy in p elements, Boltzmann
focusses not on the (indistinguishable) individual elements, but on the
(distinguishable) energy intervals defined by means of the former. Thus, he faces
the combinatorial problem of distributing the particles in different “cells” of
                                                 
55 Boltzmann requires that p/n remains finite (thermodinamic limit).
56 The three-dimensional distribution is more problematic because it requires more degrees of
freedom. No satisfactory derivation of this distribution can be found in 1868.
57 Cf. Costantini, Garibaldi, Penco 1996, 286-287.
58 For details on these analytical relationships see Bach 1990, 10-15 e Costantini, Garibaldi, Penco
1996, 286-288.
18
energy. In this way, the energy elements merely have the function of “labels” to
mark the different cells and to provide a means for a combinatorial elaboration of
them. No physical meaning is attached to the energy elements, but only a
combinatorial one.59 Furthermore, this model is completely analogous to the
model developed in 1877. The tickets in the urn do not report individual energy
elements, but rather “packets” of different dimensions. Thus, in Boltzmann’s
argument the energy elements play the role of labels useful to distinguish the
energy intervals and to weigh them from a combinatorial point of view. An
important consequence is that the combinatorial analysis both in equilibrium
theory and in non equilibrium theory relies on a common stochastic model: to
distribute n – 1 particles on p – 1 energy intervals.60
However, Alexander Bach has suggested that the energy elements may
have a more explicit meaning.61 According to Bach’s interpretation, Boltzmann
does not assume the equiprobability of the configuration of individual particles on
individual intervals, but of the occupation numbers of indistinguishable elements
on distinguishable particles. In other words, Bach claims that Boltzmann creates
his stochastic model with individual energy elements. Accordingly, Boltzmann’s
combinatorial problem becomes to calculate the occupacy numbers, i.e. how
many particles have a certain numbers of elements.62 To sum up, Bach argues that
Boltzmann adopts a Bose-Einstein statistics rather than a Maxwell-Boltzmann
statistics.
To be sure, Boltzmann’s combinatorial argument is formally unchanged in
both cases. Adopting a Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics and focussing on individual
intervals or adopting a Bose-Einstein statistics focussing on the individual
particles leads to equivalent results. Thus, the question does not concern the
formalism, but rather Boltzmann’s interpretation of the function of the energy
elements. In support of my interpretation I mention two remarks. First,
Boltzmann’s stochastic model is explicitly developed only in 1877, but the formal
similarity suggests that such a model was implicit in 1868 too. There can be little
doubt about the model in 1877: the distribution concerns packets of energy and
not individual elements. Furthermore, in 1868 Boltzmann defines the elementary
intervals as in (5) focussing on them in his combinatorial procedure.
Second, in 1868 Boltzmann states an important requirement: after a
drawing process, all the dispositions of energy which break the constraint of the
total energy have zero probability.63 If the energy were drawn in individual
element, this requirement would of course be superfluous, because the drawing
process stops with the last element. This statement becomes relevant only if the
drawing process concerns packets of energy so that the last drawing can
eventually breaks the energy constraint. Moreover, a similar requirement can be
found also in the urn model of 1877. In conclusion, the possibility to elaborate
Boltzmann’s argument as an example of Bose-Einstein statistics ante litteram is
                                                 
59 That Boltzmann’s quantization cannot be considered a physical quantization is claimed also in
von Plato, 1994, 80.
60 The analogy holds also when Boltzmann introduces the continuum case cf. Boltzmann 1877b,
187.
61 Bach 1990.
62 Cf. Bach 1990, 9.
63 Boltzmann 1868, 83.
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not enough to conclude that Boltzmann effectively used such a statistics and
leaves open the question about Boltzmann’s interpretation of the energy elements.
As we have said, in spite of the similarities between the stochastic models
in 1868 and in 1877, the argumentative structure of the two theories are deeply
different. In 1868 Boltzmann derives the Maxwell distribution adopting the
technique of marginalization, but in 1877, the combinatorial argument relies on
minimization. Does it means that Boltzmann changed his mind about probability
and combinatorial anaysis? In order to prove that this is not the case, I will briefly
review Boltzmann’s 1877 argument.
The starting point is the definition of probability of a state distribution as
the ratio between the number of complexions corresponding to that state and the
total number of possibile complexions. As the latter is a constant, a (non





where wi are the occupation numbers of each cell in the energy space. To obtain
the Maxwell distribution the quantity B  must be a maximum. By using a
semplified version of the Stirling approximation, the problem is turned into
minimizing the denominator:
!!...! 10 nwwwM = .
Or, by using logarithms, to minimize the quantity:64
nwwM ii −=∑ loglog .
To solve this problem of minimization Boltzmann adopts the method –
usual in analytical mechanics – of the Lagrangian multipliers showing that the
equilibrium distribution has the highest probability.
Why does Boltzmann change his combinatorial argument? The answer is
in the close connection between the argumentative structure and the particular
physical problems he has to face in 1868 and in 1877. Indeed, the marginalization
technique used by Boltzmann in 1868 is not suitable to face the non equilibrium
problem. This case requires a comparison between the equilibrium distribution
and each possibile non equilibrium distribution, while the marginalization allows
to compare the equilibrium with the non equilibrium as a whole. Consequently,
Boltzmann deals with the non equilibrium problem using the minimization
technique. Let us try to better understand the difference.
In 1868 Boltzmann computes a general expression (the equation (6))
expressing the probability that a certain molecule lies within a certain phase
region provided that all the configurations are equiprobable. Such a constraint is
formally represented by the Boltzmann-Liouville theorem, the so-called General
Solution to the problem of equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium distribution
obtained by Boltzmann in 1868 is somehow understood as the “implied”
                                                 
64 Boltzmann 1877b, 176
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distribution given the uniformity constraint or, in more modern terminology, it is
the “typical” distribution provided such a constraint. To calculate the typical
distribution Boltzmann does not need to compare all the possibile distributions to
each other. He only needs the uniformity constraint, i.e. the General Solution.
This strategy is perfectly feasible in the equilibrium theory which is focussed on
one physical state only.
However, in 1877 Boltzmann faces a different physical problem: to show
that the system will reach the Maxwell distribution independently of the starting
distribution. Boltzmann’s aim is to solve this problem showing that the
equilibrium distribution is the most probable, but this goal necessarly requires a
comparison of the probabilistic weights of all the possible distributions given the
uniformity constraint. This aim is clearly expressed in his programmatic
statement: «from the ratios of the numbers of the different state distributions their
probability could even be calculated».65 Thus, a new kind of probabilistic
argument is required to face a new kind of physical problem.66
As a consequence, the different argumentative structure stemming from
the common uniformity constraint and from the common stochastic model is not
due to a change in Boltzmann’s point of view, but simply to the change of the
physical context. This fact reinforces the thesis of a deep continuity in
Boltzmann’s thought and of a close interaction between probabilistic arguments
and mechanical problems.
I mention in passing a consequence of this interpretation. Already at first
sight can note the formal similarity between the expression for log M and the H-
function of 1872, a similarity stressed by Boltzmann himself.67 In my opinion, this
analogy sheds light upon the origin of this function, which was introduced without
any justification.68 Given a certain distribution, the quantity M is the number of
the complexions favourable to that distribution. Thus, it derives from the same
combinatorial analysis developed by Boltzmann in 1868. Whereas in 1868
Boltzmann worked with the marginalization procedure, in 1877 the same number
of “favourable cases” enters in a minimization process. But it is the same strategy.
Likely, the combinatorial considerations that in 1877 lead to the introduction of
the quantity M find their origin in the article of 1868. In other words, Boltzmann
framed the H-function starting from the combinatorial considerations developed
in the context of the equilibrium theory. It can be remarked that in 1872 no hints
of this origin appear and that H-function is introduced without any argument. But,
again, the physical context is relevant. In 1872, as we have seen, the physical
aspects are dominant in comparison to the probabilistic ones. Boltzmann’s goal
was to obtain a non equilibrium theory dealing with the thermodynamical problem
related to the entropy and with the trasportation phenomena. It was understood as
a generalization of Maxwell’s theory of 1867. The explication of the role played
by the combinatorial arguments and by the stochastic model will be offered only
in 1877, and the dialogue with Loschmidt was very important in this explication,
                                                 
65 Boltzmann 1877a, 121.
66 In 1878 Boltzmann will investigate also the probability that an arbitrary distribution differs from
the equilibrium one (cf. Boltzmann 1878, 250-264).
67 Boltzmann 1877b, 179.
68 In spite of its importance, the problem of the origin of the H-function is in the literature rarely
dealt with. Brush claims that Boltzmann discovered it by means of his experience in manipulating
entropy definitions and with trial-and-error- methods (cf. Brush 1986, 600).
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but they must have had a part in the transition from equilibrium to non
equilibrium theory. Likely, Boltzmann understood those arguments as a guide in
facing the difficult problem of proving the irreversible behavior of a complex
mechanical system of material points.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS.
In the previous sections it has been pointed out that Boltzmann’s thought is
characterized by a close interaction between probabilistic and mechanical
problems. It has often been claimed that Boltzmann’s research programme is
something of a generalization of Maxwell’s because it progressively tries to
remove the starting simplifying assumptions of the early kinetic theories,69 and
that programme proceeds well until Loschmidt’s objection proves the statistical
nature of the irreversibility. But Boltzmann’s research programme is more
complex. It cannot be classified as a form of naive redutionism come, at last, to a
proved impossibility and to a deserved failure. He was perfectly aware of the
statistical nature of thermodynamic laws, and his main aim was not a
unidirectional reduction, but rather a sort of “bidirectional analogy”, according to
which probabilistic concepts can be applied to some particular mechanical
systems, and the analysis of these mechanical systems can shed light upon the
statistical nature of some natural laws. The lack of a clear ontological and
epistemological hierarchy in this programme is mirrored in the conceptual
network used by Boltzmann. Thus, the peculiarity of this position is the search of
a compatibility between the point of view of the analytical mechanics and the use
of probabilistic tools.
I opened this paper stating the Klein thesis; let us see as, according to the
ideas above developed, it can be transformed:
(K1*) Boltzmann’s view of the role and the meaning of probability does
not go through deep alterations during the time. However, there is an evolution
and new different nuances come in foreground.
(K2*) The process of evolution of Boltzmann’s ideas on probability is
mainly an internal one. External influences contributed but not as decisive
criticisms.
(K3*) The theory of 1872 shows a deep mixture of mechanical and
probabilistic elements. The collision mechanism is an apparent example of a
mechanical process analyzed by means of an analogy with a stochastic model.
(K4*) Boltzmann’s view of an equilibrium process is statistical from the
very beginning. He interprets it as a long-run phenomenon. The H-theorem itself
is an average result.
(K5*) The combinatorial theory of 1877 was incited by Loschmidt’s
argument, but it is mainly an explication of elements implicitly present in the
theory of 1872 and explicitly expressed in the equilibrium theory of 1868.
                                                 
69 See, for example, Clark 1976, 56-57.
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Loschmidt’objection was not understood as a decisive criticism, but as a demand
of deepening in Boltzmann’s view of the mixing process.
To sum up, I am not claiming that Boltzmann’s ideas were established
once and for all in 1868, but that their variation and evolution are subtle. The
concepts of probability, indipendence, diffuse motion undoubtely go through as
internal evolution in which, however, changes of perspective or of standpoint are
more important than actual revolutions.
In other words, the epistemological dynamics of Boltzmann’s thought is
not as simple as that described in Klein thesis. (K1)-(K5) suggest a dynamics in
which a kind of (exclusively mechanicistic) belief is trasformed in another kind of
(statistical) belief by means of an external crucial criticism. On the contrary, I
tried to show that the probabilistic notions (equiprobability, diffusion,
independence) form a conceptual network which is compatible with the
mechanical approach and where no clear epistemological hierarchy can be
detected. Accordingly, the epistemological dynamics of Boltzmann’s thought
cannot be characterized as a transformation from a kind of belief to another, but as
an organic development where, in different physical context, every element of this
conceptual network can temporaly assume a fundamental role. I think that this
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